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Abstract—Organizations rely on physical, digital and social
mechanisms to protect their IT systems. Of all IT systems, laptops
are probably the most troublesome to protect, since they are easy
to remove and conceal. When the thief has physical possession
of the laptop, it is also difficult to protect the data inside. In this
study, we look at the effectiveness of the security mechanisms
against laptop theft in two universities. The study considers the
physical and social protection of the laptops. We analyze the logs
from laptop thefts in both universities and complement the results
with penetration tests. The results from the study show that the
effectiveness of security mechanisms from the physical domain is
limited, and it depends mostly from the social domain. The study
serves as a motivation to further investigate the analysis of the
alignment of the mechanisms across all three security domains
to protect the IT assets in an organization.
Keywords: laptop theft, case study, physical security, digital
security, social engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all IT systems, laptops are particularly hard to protect.
Laptops are mobile, easily concealable, there is a big market
to sell the hardware and there can be many of them in a
single building. With the increased data storage capabilities of
laptops, the loss of even a single laptop can induce dramatical
costs to the organization [2]. Thus, although there can be a
large number of laptops in an organization, losing even a single
laptop may not be acceptable.
Organizations open to the public are particularly at risk from
laptop theft. Hospitals and universities, for example, accept
hundreds of people that can wander in the premises every day.
Marshall et al. [3] points out that 46% of data breaches occur
in institutions open to the public: education, health care and the
government. Laptops containing sensitive medical or academic
data become highly vulnerable in these environments.
The problem security professionals face is how to pro-
tect the laptops in such open organizations. There are three
types of security mechanisms to secure laptops in a building:
digital, physical and social mechanisms. Digital mechanisms
such as laptop tracking and remote data deletion protect the
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laptop and the data in the laptop by using software. Physical
mechanisms, such as doors and cameras, physically isolate
the thief from the laptop and/or identify her in case of a
theft. Social mechanisms such as organizational policies and
rules decrease the number of mistakes by employees and
increase the resilience of employees toward social engineering.
Using digital mechanisms to protect laptops is elaborately
researched by the computer science community [4, 5, 6, 7].
However, linking these mechanisms with physical and social
mechanisms in protecting laptops is still not explored.
This paper evaluates the existing physical and social secu-
rity mechanisms for protecting laptops based on (1) logs of
laptop thefts which occurred in a period of two years in two
universities in Netherlands, and (2) 14 penetration tests in the
same universities. The goal of the penetration tests was to gain
possession of a marked laptop from an employee unaware of
the penetration test. The results from the log analysis and the
penetration tests show that the security of an asset in an open
organization depends mainly on the level of security awareness
of the employees, and to a lesser extent on the technical
or physical security mechanisms. The physical and technical
mechanisms have a passive, deterrent role on reducing theft,
while the employees have an active, preventive role.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section
2 we provide a literature overview on laptop theft. In section
3 we evaluate the logs of the laptop thefts and in section 4
we describe the penetration tests and the results from the tests.
Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and suggests a guideline
for which mechanisms should be considered first in adding
security mechanisms. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE OVERVIEW
There are two areas of research that focus on protecting
laptops: computer science and crime science.
In the computer science community, there has been a
considerable effort to model the complex security relations
between the digital, physical and social domain. Scott et
al. [8, 9] provides a holistic security model of the world by
using spatial relationship between the elements in the ambient
calculus [10]. Dragovic et al. [11, 12] presents a model which
uses the physical property of objects and the sensitivity of
the data inside the objects to identify possible threats. In
our previous work [13], we also provided a formal model
for representing and analysis of policy misalignment between
the three domains. These models provide sound policy design
but do not ensure effectiveness of security mechanisms that
enforce these policies.
There are multiple mechanisms in computer science that
work either in the physical or digital domain. In the digital
domain, several security products, such as TrueCrypt1 and
BitLocker2 provide encryption for the whole hard drive. These
solutions assume the adversary does not have physical control
of the laptop, because if the adversary has physical possession
of the laptop, she can always successfully execute a number
of attacks [14, 15, 16]. These approaches also seem to ignore
the human element, or more precisely, induce performance
overhead and decrease the usability of the laptop. A recent
study by Panemon [17] shows that the majority of non-IT
individuals, even when provided with an encrypted laptop, turn
off the encryption software.
A number of tracking applications, such as Adeona [7]
and LoJack [5], can track the location of the laptop they are
installed on. In case of theft, these solutions use the Internet
to provide the owner with the current location of the laptop.
These solutions suffer from two problems: (1) if the goal of
the theft is obtaining data from the laptop, the thief might
never connect the laptop to Internet and (2) if the goal is to
obtain the hardware, the thief can easily remove the tracking
application by flashing the BIOS and/or formatting the hard
drive.
In the computer science community, the accent is on pro-
tecting the data residing in the laptop and finding the location
of the stolen laptop. The approach from the crime science
community is more general, and considers the laptop and its
environment. The goal in this field is to prevent a thief from
stealing the laptop in the first place, by either changing the
environment surrounding the laptop or by creating situations
that will deter a thief [18]. Kitteringham [19] provides a list
of 117 strategies how to prevent laptop theft. The strategies
include the implementation of physical, digital and social
mechanisms. Although the list is elaborate, all suggested
mechanisms focus only on a single domain and do not consider
any interaction between the mechanisms.
There are several other studies that analyze laptop theft.
These reports focus on the money loss from a stolen laptop [2]
and the frequency of laptop theft and the most affected
sectors [3]. Our results are complementary, and look at the
effectiveness of conventional physical and social security
mechanisms in stopping laptop theft.
III. METHODOLOGY
Assessing the effectiveness of a security mechanism can be
achieved by auditing and penetration testing. We apply both
methodologies to investigate the most commonly used security
systems in the physical and social domain.
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First, we look at logs of recent laptop thefts in two univer-
sities in Netherlands. From the logs we obtain information
about: the last control that failed before the laptop theft,
alarms raised by the theft and the role of physical mechanisms
in securing the laptop and finding the thief, such as access
control and surveillance cameras. The logs provide valuable
information on the approaches thieves use to steal a laptop.
However, the logs provide limited information about the level
of security awareness of the employees. In particular, the logs
do not provide any information on the possible violation of
social security mechanisms, such as letting strangers inside an
office and sharing credentials between employees. Even in case
of a burglary, the logs did not provide any information how the
thief reached the burgled office. Therefore, to better understand
the effect of the security mechanisms, we orchestrated 14
penetration tests where we used social engineering to steal a
laptop. Through the tests, we observed the security awareness
of the employees as well as the efficiency of the physical
security mechanisms in both universities.
A. Log analysis
In a period of two years, the two universities suffered
from 59 laptop thefts (Figure 1). The logs from the thefts
provide (1) the location from where the laptop was stolen, (2)
protection mechanisms on the laptop, and (3) how the theft
was discovered.
1) Location of the theft: In 30% of the thefts, the thief
broke into a locked office either by forcing the door or
breaking a window. This number indicates failure of the
physical security mechanisms in both campuses. In 46% of
the thefts, the laptop was stolen when the employee left it
unattended in a public location, such as a cafeteria or meeting
room. These thefts indicate the level of security awareness of
the employees. In 19% of the cases, the theft occurred when
the employee left the office for a short period of time without
locking the door. These results show a combined failure of the
physical and social mechanisms. The low security awareness
let the users leave the laptops unattended in a restricted area,
and the physical security mechanisms did not protect the
laptops from being stolen.
2) Protection mechanisms on the laptop: In five of the
thefts that occurred in an unlocked office, the laptop was
locked with Kensington lock. Only one of the laptops stolen
in a public location was locked with a Kensington lock.
3) Theft discovery: The majority of the thefts (93%) were
reported by the laptop owner. In a few cases the report came
from an employee who observed a broken door or window
(5%). Only one of the thefts triggered an alarm. In this case,
the thief grabbed the laptop while the employee went to
collect print outs and left through the fire door, triggering
the fire alarm. In all buildings, in both universities, there
are surveillance cameras (CCTV) and either partially or fully
centralized access control systems able to log access requests.
Surprisingly, the systems provided no useful information in
any of the thefts. These mechanisms are further analyzed in
section IV.
Locked Open Restricted Public No Total
office office location location details
(burglary)
Stolen laptops 18 11 2 27 1 59
Cut Kensington locks 1 5 0 1 0 7
Other physical damage 16 0 0 0 0 16
Figure 1. Information from the logs. The logs from both universities are merged to anonymize the data.
4) Limitation of the logs: The logs provide information
obtained after the theft took place, based on evidence found
by the police and the security guards. The logs provide
information only of successful theft attempts, but do not show
when the security controls have succeeded in stopping the
thief. Moreover, the logs do not provide information on how
the thief reached the location nor on whether the security
awareness of the employees contributed to the theft.
Researchers and organizations recognize that the employees
are the weakest link in the organization [20, 21, 22]. Since
the logs from the laptop thefts were insufficient to provide
us with this information, we orchestrated a set of penetration
tests where we used social engineering as a means to obtain
a laptop.
B. The penetration tests
To perform the penetration tests, we enlisted the help from
45 master students in computer security who took the role of
penetration testers. Before performing the tests we informed
and received permission for the penetration tests from the chief
security officers in both universities. We informed the officers
exactly which locations we were going to test and the names
of the staff and students involved. No other security person in
the universities knew of the tests. The tests were approved by
the legal department from the universities.
The students were divided in teams of three. The goal
of each team was to steal a clearly marked laptop from an
employee who was unaware of the penetration test. First, we
did a pilot study with only three teams and three laptops. Based
on the results and insights of the pilot study, we performed an
additional 11 penetration tests the next year.
The rest of the section defines (1) the roles in a penetration
test, (2) the setup, (3) the execution and (4) the closure phase
in the test, and discusses (5) the results and (6) the limitations
of the tests.
1) Roles in the penetration test: We define five roles in the
penetration tests.
1 Coordinator - an employee responsible for the exper-
iment and the behavior of the penetration tester. The
coordinator orchestrates the penetration tests.
2 Penetration tester - a student who attempts to gain
possession of the asset without being caught.
3 Contact person - an employee who volunteers to dis-
tribute the asset to the custodians.
4 Custodian - an employee at whose office the laptop is
placed.
5 Employee - person in the university who has none of the
roles above.
Figure 2. In nine of the tests the custodians willingly gave the laptop, either
believing that the teams were from the help desk or that they were sent by
the coordinator.
Figure 3. In five tests the teams social engineered a person other than the
custodian. In two of these cases the students used a bolt cutter to cut the
Kensington lock, and in three cases they found the keys from the lock in the
office.
2) Setup of the environment: At the start of the study we
used snowball sampling [23] to recruit a group of contact
persons and custodians. We chose four contact persons, who
in turn searched for other volunteers willing to take part in the
study as custodians.
After selecting the contact people and the custodians, we
bought and marked 14 laptops as assets to be stolen. The con-
tact persons asked the custodians to sign an informed consent
form, and then distributed the clearly marked laptops, each
with a web-camera and a Kensington lock. The custodians
resided in two different universities in nine different buildings.
To steal any of the laptops, the penetration testers needed to
circumvent at least three layers of access control: the entrance
of the building, the entrance of the office where the custodian
works and the Kensington lock.
To avoid bias in the study, none of the custodians was aware
of the real purpose of the study. Instead, we informed the
custodians that the universities were conducting a usability
study on the new laptops, and thus they needed to measure
the satisfaction level of the laptop users. We informed the
custodians that the level of satisfaction would be measured
using motion detection web-cameras that would record the
usage of the laptops. Furthermore, for security reasons, the
contact people instructed the custodians to lock the laptops
with a Kensington lock and to leave the cameras recording at
all times. The contact people also asked the custodians not to
leave any private nor work related data on the laptops. With
these measures, we tried to reduce the risk of data leakage
and loss of productivity caused by any theft. More detailed
analysis of the methodology and the motivation behind the
decision design is presented in [24].
3) Execution of the penetration tests: After setting up
the environment, we gave each of the penetration teams the
location of a single laptop they should obtain. In the first
part, each team scouted their location and collected as much
information as possible about the custodian and the security
mechanisms at the location. Then, each team proposed a list
of attack scenarios they wanted to conduct. A sample attack
scenario is presented in Figure 4. During the second part of
the test, after getting approval for executing the scenarios by
the coordinator, the teams started testing.
The actions of the teams were logged using the web-cameras
we positioned in the offices of the custodians and through
recording devices carried by the teams during the attacks.
We used such comprehensive recordings (1) to have a better
overview of why the attacks succeeded/failed and (2) to be sure
the employees were treated with respect by the penetration
testers. The students were asked to try to avoid the CCTV
cameras, to reflect the behavior of a real thief.
After each successful or failed attempt, the teams provided
an attack trace listing which mechanisms they circumvented
and, in case of failed attempts, which mechanism caused the
attack to fail. Figure 5 provides a summary of the successful
approaches of teams and the disguises they used to obtain the
laptop.
4) Closure: After all penetration tests were over, we de-
briefed the custodians and the contact people through a group
presentation, where we explained the penetration test and its
goal. All custodians and contact people were thanked and
rewarded for helping in the assessment of the security in their
university.
5) Results: Surprisingly, all teams were eventually success-
ful in stealing their laptop. Besides the 14 successful thefts,
there were an additional 11 unsuccessful attempts.
The favorite approach of the teams was to confront the
custodian directly and ask for the laptop. Nine of the teams
took roles as service desk employees, students that urgently
1. Social engineer night pass from an employee.
2. Enter the building early in the morning.
3. Social engineer the cleaning lady to access the office.
4. Cut any protection on the laptop using a bolt cutter.
5. Leave the building during office hours.
Figure 4. Example of an attack scenario
needed a laptop for a few hours or claimed that they were sent
by the coordinator. Four teams used mobile phones or pocket
video cameras to record the conversation with the employees.
In one case they took a professional camera and a cameraman,
and told the custodian the recording is part of a study to
measure the service quality of the service desk.
Approach Disguise
Social engineered the custodian as coordinator helpers 5
as help desk 2
as students 2
Social engineered the janitor as students 4
Social engineered the cleaning lady as PhD student 1
Figure 5. Approaches and disguises of the penetration testing teams
The resistance of the employees against social engineering
varied. In six cases, the custodians gave the laptop easily
after being shown a fake email and being promised they
would get the laptop back in a few hours. In two cases the
custodian wanted a confirmation from the coordinator. The
teams succeeded in the attempt because the custodian called
a number provided by the penetration testers. Needless to say,
the number was of another team member pretending to be
the coordinator. In one case a colleague of the custodian got
suspicious and sent an email to campus security. Since only
the chief security officer knew about the penetration test, in
a few hours the security guards all over the campus were all
alerted and started searching for suspicious students.
However, in five cases the students were not able to social
engineer the custodian directly and were forced to look for
alternative approaches. For example, in one of the cases
the students entered the building before working hours. At
this time a cleaning lady cleaned the offices, and under the
assumption it was their office let the students inside. After
entering the office, the students cut the Kensington lock and
left the building before the custodian arrived. On the way out,
they even asked the same cleaning lady to lock again the office
door.
6) Limitations of the test: A limitation of the test might
be the high self-confidence of the testers. The security guards
were not aware of the penetration test. If caught, the identifi-
cation process would be unpleasant experience for the testers.
Nevertheless, they knew they will not go to jail for their
actions. A thief might rather wait for the laptop to be left
unattended than approaching an employee directly and asking
for their laptop.
IV. OBSERVATIONS
We observed three main security mechanisms in the uni-
versities: surveillance cameras, access control and a level of
security awareness of the employees.
A. Surveillance cameras
Security officers do not use cameras as alarming mecha-
nisms, but use recorded footages a posteriori, to identify an
offender after an accident has taken place. The security officers
cannot afford to monitor all surveillance cameras. The cameras
work only when a motion is detected, and automatically store
the recording in a back end server. The delay between the
occurrence and report of the theft gives the thief sufficient
time to leave the building.
Even when used to identify the thief a posteriori, the
cameras provide limited information about the thief. In none
of the logs nor during any of the penetration tests the cameras
provided enough information to reveal the identity of the thief.
The CCTV system is providing limited help because (1) the
cameras are not mounted in offices, (2) the thief can easily
conceal the laptop and (3) thieves usually know the position
of the cameras and obscure their face.
The cameras are not mounted in offices. All penetration tests
and 49% of the thefts took place in an office. Cameras are not
mounted in offices to preserve the privacy of the employees
and because mounting cameras in every office is not cost
effective. Without surveillance in these offices, it is impossible
to identify a thief during the act.
Instead of offices, the cameras are usually mounted on the
entrance of buildings. Many people pass through the entrances
with bags, and each of the bags might conceal a stolen laptop.
Even if there are only two persons observed by the camera,
if the persons are not caught on the spot and challenged by
the security guards, the evidence from the surveillance camera
can not be used against them.
Cameras positioned to monitor public locations, such as
cafeterias, halls and reception desks can record the thief during
the theft. The logs show that 46% of the laptop thefts happened
in public locations. During the penetration tests we noticed that
these cameras are usually triggered by motion detection, and
are not actively monitored by the security guards. A careful
thief would obscure her face from the cameras using a hat, a
hood or just covering her face with her hands before she steals
the laptop. In one of the penetration tests, three penetration
testers wandered with newspapers on top of their faces through
the building without being challenged by anybody.
In conclusion, the surveillance system provides no help in
stopping the theft and has limited usage in identifying the thief
a posteriori.
B. Access control
We spotted two weaknesses of the access control in the
universities. Locks are usually bypassed because (1) they are
disabled during working hours and (2) the doors and windows
where the locks reside are easy to force.
The access controls on the entrances of the building are
easily bypassed because they are disabled during working
hours and because there are too many people with credentials
that can open the door. From the 14 penetration teams, 13
bypassed the entrance locks by attacking during working hours
and one team social engineered credentials from an employee
to enter the building out of working hours.
Another attack vector for stealing a laptop is to force a
door or a window. The penetration teams were not allowed
to damage any property of the universities except cutting the
Kensington locks. However, the logs from actual laptop thefts
show that in 30% of the thefts, the thief broke a door or a
window to get access to the office.
Similarly to recordings from surveillance cameras, logs
from the access control systems provide limited help in
identifying the thief. The logs show whose credential was used
to enter a restricted area at a specific time period. Since the
credentials are easy to steal or social engineer and because
there are many people entering and leaving the area where the
theft occurs, it is hard to deduce which person is the thief.
In conclusion, the typical access control mechanisms de-
ployed in the universities are mainly used to deter opportunis-
tic thieves, but provide no help against a determined thief.
C. Security awareness of the employees
The level of security awareness of the employees plays
a crucial role in success or failure of a theft. The human
element is the main reason behind the success of the laptop
thefts. In 69% of the laptop thefts and 100% of the penetration
tests, the theft occurred either because the employee left the
laptop unattended in a public location or did not lock the door
when leaving the office. Similarly, during the penetration tests,
employees opened door from offices of their colleagues, shared
credentials or handed in laptops without any identification.
Therefore, even with strong access control in place, if the
security awareness of the employees is low, the access control
can easily be circumvented.
On the other hand, the human element is the main reason
behind the failure of 67% of all failed penetration tests. In
these cases, an employee informed the security guards for
suspicious activities, rejected to open a door for the tester,
rejected to unlock a laptop without permission from the
custodian or interrupted the tester during the theft. In these
cases, the employees besides enforcing the access control
mechanisms, also played a role as an additional surveillance
layer around the laptop.
Employees are usually considered as the weakest link in
the security of an organization. We observe that employees
can also be the strongest link in the security of open orga-
nization. A proper security education of employees increases
the employee’s resistance to social engineering, and increases
effectiveness of the other security mechanisms.
D. Limitations of the observations
The observations from the test and log analysis is based
on the security mechanisms in two open institutions. The
observations may apply to other mobile assets, such as medical
equipment, beamers and mobile phones in institutions open to
the public. However, other types of organizations might have
different spectrum of mechanisms for protecting their laptops.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we evaluated the security mechanisms from
the physical and social domain that influence laptop theft in
organizations open to the public. We analyzed the logs of
laptop thefts which occurred in a period of two years in two
universities in Netherlands. We complemented the findings
from these logs with 14 penetration tests, in which we used
social engineering to gain possession of marked laptops.
We observed that (1) mechanisms from a single domain
can provide only limited protection against laptop and (2)
the effectiveness of a physical security mechanism depends
mainly from its alignment with security mechanisms from
social domain.
From this study we identify two research questions:
1) How to formally analyze the alignment of the mecha-
nisms from all three domains and find possible threats
that lead to laptop theft?
2) How to test the implementation of the mechanisms using
all actions available to the thief: digital penetration test-
ing, obtaining physical access and social engineering?
In the future we will focus on three areas: First we plan to
expand this exploratory study by performing another series of
penetration tests to obtain statistically significant results. Sec-
ondly, we intend to build upon our previous work in analysis of
security policies to provide designs which enhance the effec-
tiveness of the security mechanisms. Finally, we will focus on
developing better methodologies for penetration testing where
testers can use physical access and social engineering. Such
methodologies should provide reliable and reportable results
from testing the implementation of the mechanisms.
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